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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
By AUSTIN W. ScoT, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
In the criminal law field, the reported cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court during 1957 deal, as usual, mostly with procedural
problems, and only to a lesser extent with problems of substantive
criminal law.
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
POWER TO CREATE CRIMES

Under its so-called "police power" a state has broad power to regulate its internal affairs for the protection or promotion of the public
welfare-particularly the health, safety or morals of its people; and it
is common for state legislation so regulating to provide criminal penalties for violations. No doubt much that is done in the name of promoting the public welfare is the result of the effective operation of
pressure groups on the legislature, rather than the result of a genuine
determinaton by the legislature of the requirements of the public
welfare. Courts have seldom substituted their own notions of what the
public welfare requires for those of the legislature; and similarly have
seldom held a statute invalid because they know or believe the statute
is the product of pressure from an effective lobbying group. The Colorado Supreme Court in Mosko v. Dunbar' considered the constitutionality of a 1955 Colorado criminal statute making it a misdemeanor for
anyone to sell new or used cars (excepting farm tractors and trucks) on
Sunday. Very likely the statute was passed at the instigation of Denver
car dealers who wished to eliminate the Sunday competition of suburban
dealers, who were accustomed to doing a brisk Sunday business while
their Denver colleagues were observing the Sabbath in a more solemn,
less commercial fashion. The supreme court upheld the statute in a
four to three decision, the majority stating that the legislature has the
exclusive power to determine what the public welfare requires, and that
the courts should not try to substitute their own views on the matter.
Chief Justice Moore dissented on the ground that the statute did not
in fact promote the public health, safety, morals or welfare (the legislature did not even intend that it should, since the statute was enacted
to serve the private purposes of a small group) ; and a statute which
takes away the right to work when one pleases, if not done to promote
the public welfare, constitutes a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.2 The majority view seems more in accord with
modern judicial attitudes toward the police power.
ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT

A Colorado criminal statute punishing an accessory after the fact
defines him as one "who, after full knowledge that a crime has been
1 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
2 The other two dissenters, Justices Knauss and Sutton, considered the statute
unconstitutional, not on the broad due process ground stated by Judge Moore, but on
the narrower ground that by singling out dealers in cars (as distinguished from other
products, including even farm tractors and trucks) the statute unreasonably discriminated against car dealers, in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth

amendment of the United States Constitution, and constituted a "special law" forbidden by the

Colorado Constitution.
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committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the
person charged with or found guilty of the crime. " 3 Does one "conceal"
a crime which he knows has been committed, when he merely remains
silent? The supreme court said no, in Lowe v. People.4 Something of
an affirmative nature is required in order to "conceal." The court held
that there was no evidence that Lowe concealed the crime or harbored
the criminal.
1I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
VENUE

A criminal defendant in Colorado has a constitutional right to
trial by a jury of the county wherein the crime is alleged to have been
committed.' This constitutional right, like most other such rights, is
generally considered to be for the sole benefit of the defendant, so that
he may waive it if he sees fit, as where he expressly consents to trial in
another county.6 In Vigil v. People7 the supreme court went further,
and stated that, since the defendant pleaded guilty at arraignment, the
constitutional right to a local trial was inapplicable, because there can
be no "trial" after a guilty plea. Is it true that one who wishes to plead
guilty has no right to object to doing so in a county other than the
county of the crime? The reasons for the constitutional right to a
local trial are usually expressed to be: (1) the greater ease and inexpensiveness for the defendant to produce his witnesses, since the witnesses
are most apt to be clustered around the place of the crime; and (2) the
advantage to the defendant when tried among his neighbors, friends
and acquaintances, who know his good reputation (if any) , compared
to trial among strangers who know nothing about him except the one
bad fact that he is accused of crime. It is true these reasons are more
applicable t6 a trial on a guilty plea; but the defendant does have a
right to produce in evidence mitigating circumstances after a guilty
plea, and perhaps there is a somewhat similar advantage, in a proceeding to determine the sentence, in having it held before a local, rather
than a strange and distant, judge, as there is in a trial before a local,
is distinguished from a strange and distant, jury. The question whether
3 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-1-13 (1953).

4 309 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1957).
5 Colo. Const. art. II
§ 16 (1876). Though the constitution speaks of "county or
district," this probably requires trial in the county of the crime.
6 Vigil v. People, 310 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1957) (another county in the same district),
following Davis v. People, 83 Colo. 295, 264 Pac. 658 (1928) (implied waiver by proceeding without objection to trial in another county of another district).
7 310 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1957).
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the proceedings on a plea of guilty constitute a "trial" within the meaning of the constitutional right to a local trial seems to be a novel one;
perhaps it deserves more attention than the court gave it in the Vigil
case, where it was not actually necessary to the decision. The same constitutional provision, for instance, gives the defendant a right to a
"speedy trial" and to a "public trial," as well as to a trial in the county.
Must not the proceedings be public even if the defendant pleads guilty;
and is not the defendant entitled to a speedy arraignment even though
he may at arraignment plead guilty?
In another Colorado case, there was some question as to whether
a rape was committed in X County, as the information alleged, or in
Y County. The police officer who visited the scene of the crime testified that he thought, but was not sure, it was in X County. In the
absence of any proof by the defendant to the contrary, the court held a
directed verdict for the defendant was properly denied. 8
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Two Colorado cases raise again the question of whether the trial
court, in a non-capital felony case, must, under the Colorado constitutional or statutory law or under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, inform an indigent defendant of his right to counsel
before accepting from him a guilty plea.' In Freeman v. Tinsley" the
defendant in a kidnapping case was twenty-one years old, had only a
sixth grade education, had no friends in Colorado, and, though he had
had previous trouble with the law in another state, had never had
counsel to defend him. At his arraignment, the judge apparently did
not tell him of his right to counsel and made no effor.t to appoint
counsel. (The defendant later claimed he did not know of his right
to counsel.) After the judge explained the consequences of pleading
guilty and not guilty, the defendant pleaded guilty. In Vigil vs. People"
the defendant, charged with rape, was twenty-six; no other facts of his
background appear. He too was not informed at arraignment of his right
to counsel. He expressly waived his right to be tried in the county where
the crime was committed and then pleaded guilty, receiving a twelve to
twenty year sentence. In each case the supreme court held that there was
8 Abeyta v. People, 134 Colo. 441, 305 P.2d 1063 (1957).
9 Freeman v. Tinsley, 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957); Vigil v. People, 310 P.2d 552
(Colo. 1957), expressly following Kelley v. People, 120 Colo. 1, 206 P.2d 337 (1949).
10 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957).
11 310 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1957).
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defendant's rights, under either Colorado law or fedno violation of the
12 eral due process
It is, of course, true that the supreme court has the final say as to
the meaning of the Colorado constitutiona 1 3a and statutory 4 provisions
concerning a criminal defendant's right to counsel. It is not entirely
clear whether the court is holding that Colorado law does not require
the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant in a non-capital
felony case; or that he does not have such a right if he pleads guilty
(having it only if he pleads not guilty) ; or that though he has such a
right whether he pleads guilty or not guilty, he has no right to be informed of the right, whether he knows of the right or not. It would
seem that fair criminal procedure requires that counsel should be appointed for an indigent defendant in at least a serious non-capital felony
case, even in the situation where he pleads guilty, as he should have
proper advice as to how he should plead. And if counsel should be
appointed, fairness requires that the judge tell him of this right and
make an offer to appoint counsel, at least if he does not know of his
right to appointed counsel. Doubtless there are many convicts now in
the Colorado penitentiary who were not told at arraignment of their
right to appointed counsel. The supreme court naturally does not wish
to open'the door to a flood of petitions from such people. But could
the Colorado Supreme Court not announce a new rule, applicable to
future trials only, which would incorporate some of these matters which
fair play would seem to require? 4"
As to the requirements concerning counsel imposed upon the states
by the clue process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the United
States Supreme Court has in a series of cases made it clear that the states
must appoint counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases; and as
to non-capital felony cases it all depends upon various factors: the
seriousness of the offense charged, the complexity of the issues involved,
the age, intelligence and educational background of the defendant, his
prior experience in criminal proceedings, how actively the trial judge
looked after his interests at the trial, and no doubt also whether the
12 The Freeman case is based partly on the ground that habeas corpus was the
wrong remedy, even assuming there was a violation of constitutional rights.
13 Colo. Const. art. 11, § 16: -In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel."
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-7-29 (1953), providing that district courts "may"

assign defense counsel for indigent defendents in felony or misdemeanor prosecutions
in the district courts.
14aFor a suggestion of this useful technique, see Frankfurter, J., concurring ill
Griffin v.

Illinois,

351 U.S. 12,

25-26 (1956).
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defendant is tried on a not-guilty plea or pleads guilty. 15 Applying these
tests to the two Colorado cases decided in 1957, it is not at all certain
that the United States Supreme Court would hold that the requirements
of due process were met, especially in the Freeman case, where the charge
was serious (kidnapping), the defendant was young (twenty-one), his
education was poor (sixth grade), and his prior courtroom experience
was meager. And that Court has held that due process may be violated
by a state in an appropriate non-capital case where the defendant, as
here, was not informed of his right to counsel, made no request for counsel, and pleaded guilty.'" Of course, the fact that Freeman's petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied after the
Colorado Supreme Court had affirmed his original conviction over his
contention that he was denied his right to counsel, was not a determination by the United States Supreme Court that clue process was not
violated. All that the denial of certiorari means is that, with all the pressure of business, the Court does not have time to consider the matter.'7
INFORMATION-VARIANCE BETWEEN INFORMATION AND PROOF

In one case the information charged that the defendant stole property owned by Hylda Howard; the proof showed that the owner's real
name was Hylda Vossen, though she was commonly known, to the defendant and others, as Hylda Howard. The supreme court sensibly
affirmed his conviction, over his contention of a fatal variance, on the
ground he could not possibly have been prejudiced in presenting his
defense.' s
INFORMATION-DUPLICITY

In another case, the defendant was charged with perjury, the infornation alleging in one count several lies told by the defendant on the
witness stand, all to the effect that the defendant was not guilty of
violating an injunction at place X because he was at all times at place Y.
15 See cases collected in B3oskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 271, 279 (1946). The more recent cases are:
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S.
773 (1949); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
Vade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948);
736 (1948); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948);
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947); Foster
v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Carter
v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
16 Pennsylvania ex rel.
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956), where defendant
was 21, had had 6 years of school, had one prior courtroom experience (where he had
no counsel), and was charged with several non-capital felonies.
17 The court's statement in the Freeman case 308 P.2d at 223. that denial of
certiorari shows there is no violation of due process, is thus clearly wrong.
Is Pownall v. People, 311 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1957).
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Is each falsehood a separate perjury, so that to join them all in one
count would be duplicity; or do all the falsehoods together constitute
one crime of perjury? The court held the latter, so that there was no
duplicity; and anyway, even if there was duplicity, the defendant raised
the issue too late, since he raised it for the first time during the trial."
TRIAL-EvIDIENCE

The Archina case2" involved several questions of evidence in criminal cases. A novel question was presented as to the competency of a
wife to testify against her husband, when she had married him abroad
in a civil ceremony for the sole purpose of enabling him to be admitted
to the United States, with the understanding that there should be a
later religious ceremony (never held) , and she had never slept with
him or otherwise consummated the marriage. The court held she was
not his "wife" for the purpose of the Colorado statute making a wife
incompetent to testify against her husband. The court also held that
for a deposition to be used at the trial, there must be a showing (not
here made) of the unavailability of the witness at the trial; and that
the trial court's admission of lurid photographs of various deceased persons, having no probative value and serving only to inflame the passions
of the jury, constituted prejudicial error.
In another Colorado case, the court reaffirmed its long-standing
19 Marrs v. People, 312 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1957). The court also stated that the question of whether a witness's falsehood is material (materiality being an element of
perjury) is a question for the court, not the jury.
20) Archina v. People, 307 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1957).
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view that evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure 21(in
violation of the Colorado Constitution) is nevertheless admissible.
SENTENCE

22
Several cases arose in 1957 in the wake of the 1956 Smalley case.
In two cases the principle of the Smalley case was applied so as to require
a new sentencing. In one 23 a defendant, convicted in 1953 of burglary
at age sixteen, was sentenced to the penitentiary when convicted again
of burglary in 1956 at nineteen. The court held this sentence erroneous,
since the statute (before its amendment in 1957) required that he be
sentenced to the reformatory. In the other case,24 the court held that
the Smalley case applied, so as to void an habitual criminal sentence,
even though the defendant had previously been actually sentenced
(wrongly) when under age twenty-one to the penitentiary.
In two other cases2 the court held that the reformatory statute
involved in the Smalley case-which before 1957 required the trial judge
to sentence to the reformatory instead of the penitentiary males under
twenty-one convicted of felony (except for felonies involving life-imprisonment and murder and voluntary manslaughter), was in addition
inapplicable to robbery convictions, since the robbery statute (enacted
after the reformatory statute) has a special provision giving the trial
21 Williams v. People, 215 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1957). Though the trend among other
states in recent years has been toward making such evidence inadmissible, there has
been no indication that any of the Colorado justices are disposed to change the rule.
At all events, this was not a proper case to make a new rule, as the defendant, having
consented to the search, had waived his constitutional right.
22 Smalley v. People. 134 Colo. 360, 304 P.2d 902 (1956), which was concerned with
the word "felony" in the Colorado habitual criminal statute. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 39-13-1 (1953). providing for life imprisonment for one. convicted of a felony, who
has three times previously been convicted of a "felony". Smalley had three prior
convictions, but the first one was for burglary (normally, of course, a felony) committed when he was 19. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-10-1 (1953), provides that Colorado
criminal courts "shall" sentence to the reformatory (not the penitentiary) all male
persons between 16 and 21 on their first conviction for a felony, excepting murder,
voluntary manslaughter and crimes punishable by life imprisonment. It was held (4
to 3) that Smalley's first conviction was not for a "felony", so he had only two
prior felony convictions, so he was not an habitual criminal, so his life sentence was
excessive.
The Colorado Legislature amended Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-10-1 (1953), by Colo.
Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 120, so as to provide that the judge may sentence the
first offender under 21 either to the reformatory or to the penitentiary. The result
is that the crime may be a "felony" within Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-1 (1953).
even though the sentence may be a reformatory sentence, since the offense is now
"punishable" in the penitentiary, within the definition of Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 4.
defining "felony" for all Colorado purposes. B3ut it may be expected that "Smalley"
cases will be troubling the courts for some time to come; the new law does not turn
past non-felony convictions into felonies.
23 Barrett v. People, 315 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1957).
24 Latham v. People, 317 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1957).
People, 316 P.2d 1043 (Colo. 1957); Romero v. Tinsley, 317 P.2d
25 Thompson v.
1043 (Colo. 1957).
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judge power to sentence convicted robbers under twenty-one to the penitentiary or reformatory in his discretion. Two maxims of statutory interpretation lead to this result: in the case of two conflicting statutes
(1) the later controls the earlier, and (2) the special controls the general. The court's decision is right under either maxim.
EXTRADITION

Several 1957 cases involved the validity of extradition proceedings,
where men were picked up in Colorado at the request of the governor
of another state. Colorado, like most states, has adopted the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act.2 6 The Colorado statute, after providing for

the extradition of one who is charged with a crime in another state and
has fled to Colorado, omits specifically to state, as the Uniform Act
provides, that extradition applies to parole or probation violators. Two
Colorado cases held, however, that parole violators are none the less
extraditable; they are still "charged with crime" so long as they 2have
not satisfied the judgment of conviction by serving their sentence. 1
The United States Constitution, and federal statutes implementing
the Constitution, 28 provide for extradition in the case of one who commits a crime in one state and then flees to another state. They are silent,
however, on the situation of one, at all times out of a state, who yet
commits a crime within the state, as by shooting his victim across the
border, or by obtaining property by false pretenses through the mails,
or by failing to support his family after leaving the state where the
family lives. In such cases, he has not "fled from justice" to an asylum
state. The Uniform Act (adopted by Colorado), unlike the Federal
Constitution and statutes, sensibly provides for the situation, authorizing extradition. But in Matthews v. People,29 which was a non-fugitive
case (non-support), the Nebraska governor unfortunately, in asking
Colorado for the man's extradition, worded his requisition in terms of
federal law instead of Colorado law; so the supreme court let the man
go. This is at least consistent with an earlier Colorado case where the
Indiana governor, in another non-fugitive case, requested Colorado to
extradite a man under Colorado law, but the Colorado governor unfortunately ordered his arrest pursuant to federal law."0 The truth of the
matter, as Justice Knauss points out in his dissenting opinion in the
Matthews case, is that both cases pay too much attention to form-how
can the man possibly be prejudiced by such a minor and technical
mistake?
In another extradition case, 31 a man had been convicted of a felony
in Texas in 1945, had been conditionally paroled in 1951, had then
come to Colorado in violation of his parole, and had committed a burglary here, receiving a sentence to the Colorado penitentiary. In 1955,
while he was still a guest of Colorado in Canon City, Texas tried to
extradite him as a parole violator, and the Colorado district court re26 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1-1 to 60-1-23 (1953).
27 Travis v. People, 308 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1957); Tinsley v. Woods, 313 P.2d 1006 (Colo.
1957). Another case, Cutting v. Geer, 313 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1957), allows extradition from
Colorado to Alaska, a territory rather than a state, in spite of the fact that the U.S.
Constitution on extradition, art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, speaks only of a "state", without men-

tion of a "territory".

28 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182, 3194, 3195.
2 314 P.2d 906 (Colo. 1957).
30 Stobie v. Barger, 129 Colo. 222, 268 P.2d 409 (1954).
31 Seigler v. Canterbury, 318 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1957).

(1952).
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fused to allow his extradition (on grounds not here expressed). The
man having finished his sentence in Colorado, Texas in 1957 asked
again to extradite him for the same violation of the same parole. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that the 1955 action of the district court
was res judicata, so the man could not be extradited for the same matter
in 1957. It is true that res judicata is applicable to habeas corpus extradition proceedings, though only where the decision of the first proceeding is on the merits, rather than because of some defect or irregularity
in the extradition process.
APPELLATE REVIEW

The supreme court on several occasions in 1957 reiterated its statements of prior years that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure have
no application to criminal proceedings; that a criminal defendant seeking review of his conviction on writ of error must file an abstract of
record and assignments of error; otherwise the writ of error will be
dismissed. 32 By way of contrast, the court held that the Rule of Civil
Procedure, rather than rules relating to criminal procedure, govern
the review of the trial court's action in a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by a convict, since habeas corpus is in the nature of a civil, not
a criminal, action."3 It seems quite plain that Colorado would do well
to adopt in the criminal field, as it has clone in the area of civil procedure, rules of criminal procedure based upon (though not necessarily
an exact copy of) the successful Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4
incorporating, where applicable to criminal cases, some of the sensible
rules relating to civil procedure.
FREE TRANSCRIPT FOR REVIEw

The United States Supreme Court in 1956 held, in Griffin v. Illinois,15 that the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause requires
that the state furnish an indigent defendant, who wishes to appeal his
conviction, with a free copy of the transcript of the trial proceedings,
in order to equalize justice as between the rich (who can obtain a
transcript and thus effectively appeal) and the poor (otherwise unable
effectively to appeal). In one 1957 case, the Colorado Supreme Court
recognized the binding effect of this case on Colorado, and remanded
the case to the district court for a determination of the question of the
convicted defendant's indigency.36
HABEAS CORPUS

Several cases dealt with the availability of the remedy of habeas
corpus to one who is serving his sentence after having been convicted
of a crime.37 In the Freeman case, already discussed on the question of
the right of counsel, the court held that habeas corpus is not a proper
remedy to upset a conviction obtained at a trial at which this right was
32 Rochon v. People, 306 P.2d 1080 (Colo. 1957); Armbeck v. People, 313 P.2d 715
(Colo. 1957); Williams v. People, 315 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1957). However, the court does
sometimes look at the merits of the defendant's case, in spite of the fact that the
defendant failed to use the correct procedure for review.
33 Barrett v. People, 315 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1957) (no abstract of record or assign-

ment of error).
34 See Scott, Criminal Procedure in Colorado, 22 Rocky Mt. I,. Rev. 221 (1950).
35 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
36 In re Patterson's Petition, 317 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1957) (if indigent. one is entitled
to a free transcript or bill of exceptions).
37 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957); Barrett v. People, 315 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1957); Farrell v.
District Court, 311 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1957). One case dealt with habeas corpus after
arrest and before trial: Oates v. People, 315 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1957).
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violated. The court nevertheless went on to consider whether the right
was violated, concluding it was not. The reason given was that habeas
corpus lies after conviction only if the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the crime or the defendant, or if the court imposed a void sentence.
Of course, the rule about the availability of habeas corpus in federal
courts after a federal conviction is expressed also in terms of jurisdiction,
yet the United States Supreme Court has held there is no "jurisdiction"
where the defendant's right to counsel is denied."8 Most states probably
follow the federal lead and allow habeas corpus. Perhaps the remedy
in Colorado is a writ of error coram nobis, addressed to the trial court;
or its modern equivalent, a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.31 The important thing is that, in right-to-counsel cases, there be
some available remedy other than the writ of error.
DoUBl

iOI'ARDY
J

One unusual case involved the problem of double jeopardy.
Defendant was charged with embezzlement of public funds, was convicted,
and took his case to the supreme court for review. Before the supreme
court rendered a decision, the defendant was again charged in effect
with the same embezzlement, and the second trial began. Then the
supreme court reversed the first conviction. The second trial proceeded,
over the defendant's objections of former jeopardy, resulting in his conviction. He again applied for a writ of error. This time the supreme
court reversed on the ground of double jeopardy. While there is no
double jeopardy in a new trial conducted after the defendant's original
conviction is reversed, the new trial must begin after, not before, the
reversal takes place.
's Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Court there pointed out that there
must be some remedy other than appeal, since a defendant without counsel generally
finds it difficult or impossible to appeal.
89 Most jurisdictions would probably hold this remedy not available, because it is
generally allowed only to raise issues of fact not known at the trial, which if known
might have led to another result. In cases of criminal trials without counsel, it is
hard to find that there were any unknown facts.
40 Bustamante v. People, 317 P.2d 885 (Colo.

1957).
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